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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF REFERENCE POINTS ON FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS 
	  
AKAR, Betül   
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Emin Karagözoğlu 
 
 
July 2014 
 
 
In this study, we empirically investigate the effects of reference points on fairness 
judgments with the help of the vignette technique. Specifically, we examine (i) 
whether reference points have influence on fairness judgments or not, (ii) if and how 
counter-intuitive reference points influence fairness judgments, and (iii) how the 
asymmetry of reference points shape fairness judgments. For that purpose, we use a 
within-subject design, in which participants are confronted with three versions of 
vignette: vignettes without reference point, vignettes with salient reference point, and 
vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point. Consequently, our findings suggest 
that (i) the reference points significantly influence fairness judgments, (ii) 
introducing counter-intuitive reference points moderate the salience of reference 
points, and (iii) the asymmetry of salient reference points has a concave relationship 
with fairness judgments, while the asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference points 
does not affect fairness judgments.  
Keywords: Fairness, Reference points, Vignette technique
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ÖZET 
 
 
REFERANS NOKTALARININ ADALET KARARLARI ÜZERİNDEKİ 
ETKİLERİ 
AKAR, Betül   
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emin Karagözoğlu 
 
Temmuz 2014 
 
 
Bu çalışmada, referans noktalarının adalet kararları üzerindeki etkilerini vinyet 
tekniği yardımıyla araştırıyoruz. Özellikle (i) referans noktalarının adalet kararlarını 
etkileyip etkilemediğini, (ii) akla-yatkın olmayan referans noktalarının adalet 
kararlarını nasıl etkilediğini, ve (iii) referans noktalarının asimetrisinin adalet 
kararlarını nasıl şekillendirdiği inceliyoruz. Bu amaçla, katılımcılara üç farklı vinyet 
versiyonunun sunulduğu - referans noktasız vinyet, belirgin referans noktalı vinyet, 
ve akla-yatkın olmayan referans noktalı vinyet - bir denek içi dizayn kullanıyoruz. 
Sonuç olarak, bulgularımız (i) referans noktalarının adalet kararlarını belirgin bir 
şekilde etkilediğini, (ii) akla-yatkın olmayan referans noktaları ortaya koymanın 
referans noktalarının belirginliğini azalttığını, ve (iii) belirgin referans noktaları ile 
adalet kararları arasında iç bükey bir ilişki varken, akla-yatkın olmayan referans 
noktalarının adalet kararları üzerinde etkisi olmadığını öne sürmektedir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Adalet, Referans noktaları, Vinyet tekniği 
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CHAPTER 1 	  	  
INTRODUCTION 	  	  
A growing experimental literature on the effects of reference point in negotiations 
reports that culture, environmental cues, focal points, historical precedents, norms, 
previous agreements, tradition, and values of relevant economic parameters can 
emerge as a reference point. For instance, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) and 
Bazerman (1985) show that previous agreement, even if expired, is an important 
factor affecting the outcome of current negotiations. In the light of their theoretical 
study, Gupta and Livne (1989) point out that the reference point, in the form of 
previous agreement, has a great impact on negotiation outcomes. More recently, 
Blount, Thomas-Hunt, and Neale (1996), Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), Abeler, 
Falk, Götte, and Huffman (2011), Herweg and Schmidt (2013), Bartling and Schmidt 
(2014), and Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder (2014) find that contracts, expired contracts, 
expectations, historical contractual conditions, and norms can act as a reference point 
and strongly influence the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. In this 
study, on the other hand, we evaluate the effects of reference points on fairness 
judgments in negotiations from the point of view of an impartial spectator.   
There have been a considerable number of studies arguing that what people 
perceive as “fair” vary with respect to whether they are in the shoes of an impartial
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spectator or in an actual negotiation (see, for instance, Babcock,	   Loewenstein, 
Issacharoff, and Camerer,	  1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Gächter and Riedl, 
2005, 2006; Karagozoglu and Riedl, 2010). All these studies report that fairness 
judgments are likely to be biased in a self-serving manner. Therefore, we expect that 
people can be more unbiased, while responding to the hypothetical situations in the 
shoes of impartial spectator rather than in the actual negotiation. For this reason, we 
employ the vignette technique to assess people’s fairness judgments. In particular, 
we design and conduct a survey consisting of thirteen vignettes (hypothetical 
scenarios) and a post-experimental questionnaire. 
We contribute to the existing literature by empirically investigating the 
effects of reference points on fairness judgments. Specifically, we examine (i) 
whether the reference points influence fairness judgments or not, (ii) if and how the 
counter-intuitive reference points influence fairness judgments, and (iii) how the 
asymmetry of reference points shapes fairness judgments. For that purpose, we use a 
within-subject design, in which subjects are confronted with three versions of 
vignette: vignettes without reference point, vignettes with salient reference point, and 
vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point. Our vignette design provides enough 
context and information for subjects by presenting them a hypothetical situation and 
persons. Specifically, in our study, vignettes introduce the bargaining problem with 
reference points to subjects and then ask them about their opinion on how to 
distribute surplus “fairly” between two persons.  
Our vignette design also allows us to investigate our aims. To explore 
whether the reference points have influence on fairness judgments, we compare the 
responses in the vignettes without reference point to in the vignettes with salient 
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reference point. To study the effects of counter-intuitive reference points, we make 
pair-wise comparisons across three versions of vignette. To examine how the 
asymmetry of reference points affects fairness judgments, we vary the reference 
points over nine possible values.   
Our study makes several important contributions on the existing literature. 
First, to our knowledge, our study is the first to combine three versions of vignette 
into one design and thereby provides us to test directly whether the reference points 
influence fairness judgments. Second, contrary to previous studies as sited here, we 
explore the effects of asymmetry by comparing fairly a high number of reference 
points. Third and foremost, our study is the first to underscores the importance of 
salient reference point by introducing counter-intuitive reference points.  
By means of our vignette design, we first find that reference points 
significantly influence the fairness judgments. Our findings suggest that subjects do 
take into account the reference points, while making their decisions. Second, we 
observe that introducing counter-intuitive reference points moderate the salience of 
reference points. Our data reports that subjects’ answers in the vignettes with 
counter-intuitive reference point do not differ from in the vignettes without reference 
point. Namely, subjects behave as if they were confronted with the vignettes without 
reference points. Moreover, compared to the other vignettes, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in fairness judgments in the vignettes with counter-intuitive reference 
point. Third, we see that the asymmetry of reference points is an important factor 
affecting subjects’ fairness judgments. There is a concave relationship between the 
asymmetry of reference point and subjects’ fairness judgments in the vignettes with 
salient reference point. On the other hand, we find that the asymmetry of counter-
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intuitive reference points does not affect subjects’ fairness judgments. Our data 
indicates that subjects’ answers are identical across the vignettes with counter-
intuitive reference point. On the other hand, we also observe that the asymmetry of 
reference points leads to higher heterogeneity in subjects’ fairness judgments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next chapter, we review 
the related literature. In chapter 3, we present the methodology and design of our 
vignette study. In chapter 4, we develop our research hypothesis. In chapter 5, we 
report the results and in chapter 6 we conclude. In the Appendices, we report the 
results of post-experimental questionnaire and present sample vignettes. 
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CHAPTER 2 	  	  
RELATED LITERATURE 	  	  	  	  
There are several studies employing the vignette method to explore the views of an 
impartial spectator on what is a fair distribution in different economic environments 
(see Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2011 for a review). One of the first examples is the 
study of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984). Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) discuss whether a 
departure from equal-split distribution comes from differences in needs, in tastes or 
in beliefs in a simple exchange economy. For that purpose, they use a between 
subject design where different groups of subjects are confronted with three versions 
of vignette. Specifically, these versions differ with respect to needs, tastes and beliefs 
and all of them ask subjects to report their opinion about how to distribute a bundle 
of goods fairly between two persons. Their results point out that differences in needs 
are considered to be a justification for the departure from equal-split. Along the same 
lines, Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989) use a vignette technique for analyzing the 
principles of distributive justice in a production context. In order to investigate the 
reasons for income differences, they confront different groups of subjects with four 
versions of vignette, in which production depends on either effort or talent. In these 
vignettes subjects are asked to indicate their opinion about how to divide profit or
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loss fairly in a partnership between two persons. Their findings reveal the importance 
of effort for income differences. More recently, Konow (2003) conduct an extensive 
survey by employing the vignette technique to assess the normative and positive 
theories of justice. However, contrary to previous studies as cited here, instead of 
asking subjects their views on what is fair, this study ask them to rate distributions, 
policies, or situations described in vignettes as “fair” or “unfair”. 
There is also some recent experimental study that inspired us to conduct this 
vignette study. For instance, our paper is closely related and complementary to 
Gächter and Riedl (2006), who empirically investigate the bargaining problems with 
claims. Specifically, they assess both the people’s fairness judgments as well as 
people’s actual bargaining behavior with the help of a vignette study and a 
bargaining experiment. They also examine the predictability of three bankruptcy 
rules in a bargaining with claims environment. In the vignette study, Gächter and 
Riedl (2006) confront different groups of subjects with two versions of vignette. In 
particular, two versions are asymmetric with respect to two claims and both of them 
ask subjects to answer a question on what a fair division would be from the point of 
view of an impartial spectator. As a result, they report that the asymmetry of claims 
strongly influence the fairness judgments. In addition, their findings suggest that the 
answers in vignettes come closest to the proportional solution, whereas the 
bargaining outcomes are closest to the constrained equal-award solution. Although 
our vignette design is quite different from Gächter and Riedl (2006), we address the 
same research question, regarding to the effects of asymmetry. It is therefore our 
study is complementary to Gächter and Riedl (2006).  
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Our study is also related to the study of Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009). As 
Gächter and Riedl (2006), Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009) empirically study on the 
bargaining problems with claims. They conduct a questionnaire study, in which 
different groups of subjects are confronted with two versions of questionnaire: the 
Firm version and the Pension version. In their study, in contrast to Gächter and Riedl 
(2006), they vary not only claims but also the sum of claims over three possible 
values. Specifically, in both versions they present subjects to nine bargaining 
problems with claims and ask them to choose the most fair distribution from the 
predictions of bankruptcy rules. By means of their research design, they compare the 
three bankruptcy rules and report that Egalitarian solution better predicts the answers 
in the Firm version than in the Pension version.  
Our vignette design shares some similarity with the design of aforementioned 
studies, although we study on different subject, namely bargaining problems with 
reference points. For example, as in the study of Gächter and Riedl (2006) and 
Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009), in our study we introduce the bargaining 
environment by presenting a hypothetical firm to subjects and serve the reference 
point as the firm’s previous policy for splitting surplus. Moreover, similar to all 
previous studies as cited here, we assess people’s fairness judgments by asking 
subjects to indicate their impartial views on what is a fair division. On the other 
hand, our vignette design considerably differs from the aforementioned studies in 
three aspects. First, contrary to all previous studies as cited here, we use a within-
subject design and thereby having an opportunity to make individual comparisons 
and test for individual effects. Second, in contrast to Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), 
Konow (2003), and Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009), however in the line with 
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Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989) and Gächter and Riedl (2006), in order to avoid 
framing effects, we ask subjects to indicate what is a fair division instead of asking 
them to choose a fair division from a number of predictions of theoretical rules. 
Third, compared to Gächter and Riedl (2006) and Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009), 
we examine the effects of asymmetry by varying the reference point over fairly a 
high number of values. That is, we manipulate the reference points over nine 
possible values, while Gächter and Riedl (2006) and Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009) 
vary claims over 2 and 3 possible values, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 	  	  	  	  
In order to assess the fairness judgments of subjects, we used the vignette method in 
our study. Vignette method is very useful to explore fairness judgments of subjects, 
since we expect that subjects can be more unbiased while they respond to a 
hypothetical situation than being directly asked about their views. Moreover, by 
presenting subjects a hypothetical situation and persons, the vignette method can 
give enough context and information for them to have an understanding of the real 
life bargaining situations (Bartner and Renold, 2000). 
In our vignette study, subjects first received the general instructions in which 
we introduced the bargaining problem to subjects and informed them about the 
common features of vignettes. We then read the general instructions aloud in order to 
make the rules of the vignette study common knowledge. Specifically, subjects were 
presented the following instructions (translated from Turkish): 
Imagine two persons, named as A and B, are working in a hypothetical firm. 
Their work is to count the number of 1s in randomly generated 6×6 panels 
filled with 0s and 1s”. They work on this task simultaneously for a limited 
period of time and face the same set of panels in the same sequence. A panel 
looks like this: 
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1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
The performance of A and B are measured with the task described above. The 
person who count higher number of panels correctly is considered as “high 
performer”, while the other person is considered as “low performer”.  If the 
number of panels correctly counted by A and B are equal, both A and B are 
considered as “ equal performer”. 
At the end of the task, if the total number of panels correctly counted by A 
and B are higher than 15, they earn the total of 9000 points. Afterwards, 
they will bargain over the division of the amounts that they earned. If they 
reach an agreement, they earn what they agree on. Otherwise, they earn 
nothing. If the total number of panels correctly counted by A and B are less 
than 15, both of them earn nothing. 
Historically, persons who worked in this hypothetical firm worked on the 
aforementioned task as well. At the end of the task, the persons who have the 
same performances with A and B earned the amounts that is less than the 
total of 9000 points depending on the economic conditions of the firm.  It is 
also known that one of the factors that the firm took into account while 
splitting the surplus between the persons is their performances. 
 
 
After reading instructions aloud, subjects were confronted with thirteen vignettes, 
which were completely independent of each other. In each vignette, subjects were 
asked about their opinion on how to distribute 9000 points fairly between A and B. 
While making their decisions, subjects were asked to put themselves in the shoes of a 
non-involved, neutral third party and to assume that their decisions determine the 
payoffs of the two persons in such a situation.  In particular, subjects were asked to 
answer the following question (adapted from Babcock et al., 1995): 
“According to your opinion, what would be a fair division of 9000 points 
between A and B at the end of the bargaining that they made in order to share 
the amounts they earned?”  
(Please use exact amounts; no intervals! The amounts should sum up to 9000 
points!) 
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In our vignette study, we used a within-subject design, in which subjects were 
confronted with three versions of vignette: vignettes without reference point, 
vignettes with salient reference point, and vignettes with counter-intuitive reference 
points. The reason why we used within-subject design is that it allows us to test for 
individual effects, make individual comparisons, and have more powerful test 
results. Nevertheless, one disadvantage of within-subject design is the problem of 
order effects. In our study, therefore, we presented the vignettes to subjects in a 
different order to eliminate order effects. Below, we summarize the common features 
of three versions: 
• Version 1 (V1): Vignettes without reference point 
o Subjects were confronted with four vignettes. 
o The information about firm’s previous policy for splitting the surplus is not 
given. The only available information is the previous surplus. 
o Subjects were presented the following vignette (translated from Turkish): 
Historically, high performers and low performers, who worked in this 
hypothetical firm, earned the total of 4500 points at the end of the task they 
worked on. However, the amounts that high and low performers received are 
not known. 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in 
the same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points at the end of the 
task they worked on. In order to share the surplus, they have to bargain over 
9000 points. In case of disagreement, they will earn 0 point. 
 
• Version 2 (V2): Vignettes with salient reference point 
o Subjects were confronted with five vignettes. 
o The information about firm’s previous policy for splitting surplus is given.  
o Historically, the surplus was split according to performance.  
o Subjects were presented the following vignette (translated from Turkish): 
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The detailed information about how the previous surplus was split among 
persons, who worked in this hypothetical firm, is stated below. 
 
Previous surplus: 4500 points 
The amounts that high performers received: 3747 points 
The amounts that low performers received: 753 points 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in 
the same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points, at the end of the 
task they worked on. Due to the change in firm’s policy for distribution of 
surplus, they have to bargain over 9000 points. In case of disagreement, they 
will earn 0 point. 
 
• Version 3 (V3): Vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point 
o Subjects were confronted with four vignettes. 
o The information about firm’s previous policy for splitting the surplus is 
given. 
o Historically, high performers received lower amounts of surplus, while low 
performers received higher amounts of surplus. 
o Subjects were presented the following vignette (translated from Turkish): 
The detailed information about how the previous surplus was split among 
persons, who worked in this hypothetical firm, is stated below. 
 
Previous surplus: 4500 points 
The amounts that high performers earned: 756 points 
The amounts that low performers earned: 3744 points 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in 
the same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points at the end of the 
task they worked on. Due to the change in firm’s policy for distribution of 
surplus, they have to bargain over 9000 points. In case of disagreement, they 
will earn 0 point. 
 
In our study, the firm’s previous policy for splitting the surplus serves as a 
reference point. However, in some of the vignettes we did not inform subjects about 
the firm’s previous policy but informed them about the previous surplus and the 
relative performance of the persons previously worked in this hypothetical firm.   
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Thus, by comparing answers in the two versions of vignette, namely Version 1 and 2, 
we investigate whether the reference point influence the fairness judgments or not.  
Furthermore, in some of the vignettes we assigned the higher amounts of 
surplus to low performers, whereas, the lower amounts of surplus to high performers 
in order to introduce counter-intuitive reference points. More clearly, we design four 
counter-intuitive reference points, in which the ratios of the high performers’ share to 
the low performers’ share are 1:1.66, 1:3, 1:5, and 0:1. On the one hand, we also 
proposed salient reference points, where the high performers (low performers) 
received the higher amounts (lower amounts) of surplus. Specifically, we set five 
salient reference points, where the ratios of the high performer’s share to the low 
performer’s share are 1:1, 1.66:1, 3:1, 5:1, and 1:0. Here high performers received 
nearly the same amount of surplus with low performers in the vignettes with counter-
intuitive reference point. In other words, the ratios of high performers’ share to low 
performers’ share in V2 and the ratios of the low performer’s share to the high 
performer’s share in V3 are indeed the same; however, the amounts that high 
performers received in V2 are slightly different from the amounts that low performers 
received in V3. For instance, the amount that high performers received in one of the 
vignettes in V2 is 2242 points, while the amount that low performers received in one 
of the vignettes in V3 is 2247 points. The reason why we set the amounts like this is 
to minimize on the salience of proportionality. Additionally, in case some of the 
subjects consider that there is a typo or typing mistake in the vignettes with counter-
intuitive reference point, we create uncertainty in the instruction part by saying that 
“one of the factors” that the firm took into account while splitting the surplus  
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between the persons is their “performances”. Thus, our design will allow us to show 
the effects of counter-intuitive reference points on the fairness judgments.  
We also varied the reference points over nine possible values. First of all, it is 
notable to examine the effects of strongly asymmetric reference points on the 
fairness judgments. Subjects may react in different ways, when they confront with 
vignettes with strongly asymmetric reference point. Therefore, in our vignette study, 
two of these nine reference points are strongly asymmetric that high performers (low 
performers) receive the all surplus, while low performers (high performers) receive 
nothing. Moreover, since we choose a symmetric disagreement point, namely (0,0), 
to make the Person A and B strategically equivalent, the equal-split may become a 
focal point that attracts subjects’ decisions. We therefore set a symmetric reference 
point, where equal performers receive the same amount of surplus. Finally, we 
designed our other reference points by means of proportionality. In this respect, our 
vignette design is similar to Gächter and Riedl (2006). They calculated the ratios of 
the high performer’s share to the low performer’s share, which is called as the ratios 
of the claims in their study, as 2:1 and 4:1. However, we extend the range of the 
ratios of the high performer’s share to the low performer’s share from 1.66:1 to 5:1. 
Namely, we set the ratios of high performers’ share to the low performers’ share as 
1.66:1, 3:1, and 5:1 in V2 and 1:1.66, 1:3, and 1:5 in V3. In addition to this, contrary 
to Gächter and Riedl (2006), we also manipulate the amounts of previous surplus 
over three possible values: 3000, 4500, and 6000 points. Thus, this research design 
provides us to examine how the asymmetry of reference points influences the 
fairness judgments. Table 1 summarizes our design. 
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Table 1.Our Design (all amounts in points) 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Performance Previous 
Surplus  
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯  (High, Low) 4500 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯  (High, Low) 6000 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯  (High, Low) 3000 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯  (Equal, Equal) 4500 
(2242, 3758) (0.37, 0.63) (High, Low) 6000 
(755, 2245) (0.25, 0.75) (High, Low) 3000 
(756, 3744) (0.17, 0.83) (High, Low) 4500 
(0, 6000) (0, 1) (High, Low) 6000 
(2250, 2250) (0.5, 0.5) (Equal, Equal) 4500 
(3753, 2247) (0.63, 0.37) (High, Low) 6000 
(2253, 747) (0.75, 0.25) (High, Low) 3000 
(3747, 753) (0.83, 0.17) (High, Low) 4500 
(6000, 0) (1, 0) (High, Low) 6000 
 
After answering the question in each vignette, subjects also completed the 
post-experimental questionnaire, in which they reported the factors that influenced 
their fair distribution decisions, and answered a few questions about their justice 
sensitivity, personal traits, and personal background. 
In the remainder of paper, we use abbreviations and symbols for 
convenience. That is, a vignette without reference point is denoted as WRP-previous 
surplus: WRP-3000, WRP-4500, and WRP-6000, while a vignette with reference 
point is denoted as V-previous high performers’ share: V-2242, V-755, V-756, V-0, 
V-2250, V-3753, V-2253, V-3747, and V-6000. 
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CHAPTER 4 	  	  
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 	  	  	  	  
In this study, first we determine whether the reference points influence the fairness 
judgments. If so, next we will show the effects of counter-intuitive reference points 
on the fairness judgments. Finally, we will examine how the asymmetry of reference 
points shapes the fairness judgments. Therefore, in this chapter we propose some 
hypothesis regarding these issues.  
Hypothesis 1: Fairness Judgments and Existence of Reference Points 
Experimental literature on the effects of reference points in negotiations find that 
current contracts, expired contracts, expectations, historical contractual conditions, 
norms, and previous agreements can act as a reference point and significantly 
influence the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. (see, for instance, Gupta 
and Livne, 1989; Blount et al., 1996; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Abeler et al., 
2009; Herweg and Schmidt, 2013; Bartling and Schmidt, 2014; Fehr et al., 2014). 
Similar to the previous studies, we investigate whether the firm’s previous policy, 
which serve as a reference point in our vignette study, influence the fairness 
judgments in negotiations. Therefore, these results strongly support our following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: The average high performer’s shares in V1 are not different from 
each other and do not differ from the equal split.  
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Hypothesis 1b: The variances of fairness judgments in V1 are not different from 
each other. Moreover, the variances of fairness judgments in the high performer’s 
share are greater than the variance of fairness judgments in the equal performer’s 
share. 
Hypothesis 1c: The average equal performer’s share in V1 is similar to the average 
equal performer’s share in V3. 
Hypothesis 1d: The variances of fairness judgments in the equal performer’s share 
do not differ from each other. 
Hypothesis 1e: The average high performer’s shares in V1 are lower than the 
average high performer’s shares in V2. 
Hypothesis 1f: The variances of fairness judgments in V1 are higher than the 
variances of fairness judgments in V2. 
Hypothesis 2: Fairness Judgments and Counter-Intuitive Reference Points 
Existing empirical and theoretical studies on the investigation of reference point 
effects emphasis the importance of salient reference points in negotiations. (Koop 
and Johnson, 2010; Balakrishnan, Gomez, and Vohra, 2011; Herweg and Schmidt, 
2013). In our study, we want to moderate the salience of reference points by 
introducing counter-intuitive reference points. Therefore, one may intuitively suggest 
that a counter-intuitive reference point influences negotiations in a similar way with 
a less salient reference point. As a result, decreasing salience of reference points may 
lead to reduce the use of reference points in negotiations. This result implies the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: The average high performer’s shares in V3 are similar to the average 
share high performer’s shares in V1. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The variances of fairness judgments in V3 are similar to the 
variances of fairness judgments in V1. 
Hypothesis 2c: The average high performer’s shares in V3 are lower than the 
average high performer’s shares in V2. 
Hypothesis 2d: The variances of fairness judgments in V3 are higher than the 
variances of fairness judgments in V2. 
Hypothesis 3: Fairness Judgments and Asymmetry of Reference Points 
Recent vignette study on the fairness judgments in a bargaining with claims 
environment, conducted by Gächter and Riedl (2006), suggests that the difference in 
the asymmetry of claims influence the fairness judgments. Furthermore, they report 
that the asymmetry of the claims increases the heterogeneity in fairness judgments. 
Specifically, Gächter and Riedl (2006) point out that the asymmetry of claims 
increases the average high performer’s share and the variance of fairness judgments. 
These results give rise to our last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a:  The asymmetry of salient reference points increases the average 
high performer’s share. 
Hypothesis 3b: The asymmetry of salient reference points increases the variance of 
fairness judgments. 
Hypothesis 3c:  The asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference points increases the 
average high performer’s share. 
Hypothesis 3d: The asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference points increases the 
variance of fairness judgments. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
RESULTS 	  	  
In this chapter, we first review subjects’ background information and then analyze 
the results of the fairness judgments. In order to test our hypotheses, we use non-
parametric tests and classical test of hypothesis. Namely, we use the paired t-test, 
Wilcoxon sign rank test, Kruskal -Wallis test, and Multivariate test of means, while 
assessing the fairness judgments on averages, medians, and distributions. Moreover, 
we check for the equality of variances of fairness judgments across the vignettes by 
using the one-sample variance comparison test.  
 
5.1 Subjects’ background information 	  
Our vignette study was conducted among the undergraduate and graduate students of 
economics, business administration, nutrition and dietetics, international relations, 
and engineering of Bilkent University, Hacettepe University, Gazi University, 
Middle East Technical University, and TOBB University of Economics and 
Technology. A total of 203 students participate in our vignette study; their 
participation was anonymous and voluntary. Nevertheless, a total of 7 students were 
omitted because the amounts that they proposed for Person A and B did not add up to 
9000 points in each vignette. The details about sample sizes are given in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Sample Sizes 
University Number of Students 
Bilkent Uni. 69 
Hacettepe Uni. 44 
Gazi Uni. 20 
METU 33 
TOBB ETU 37 
All 203 
 
The age of students ranged from 18 to 29 (mean 21.3) and 40 percent of 
students were male. It took students approximately 30 minutes to read general 
instructions, answer the questions in each vignette and fill in the post-experimental 
questionnaire. Moreover, we test for the order effects. However, Kruskal-Wallis test 
reports that there is no significant order effect on subjects’ fairness judgments (p = 
0.8799; p = 0.7205; p = 0.6660; p = 0.0058; p = 0.8153; p = 0.1621; p = 0.5196; p = 
0.1148; p = 0.6700; p = 0.1759; p = 0.1879; p = 0.3165; p = 0.3940). Therefore, we 
pooled the all data in our analysis. 
 
5.2 Fairness Judgments 	  
Result 1: Fairness Judgments and Existence of Reference Points 
To test our hypothesis 1, we first look at the average high and equal performers’ 
shares separately in the vignettes without reference points. We then compare the 
average high and equal performers’ shares in the vignettes without reference point 
(V1) to in the vignettes with salient reference point (V2). We further analyze the 
variances of fairness judgments in V1 and V2. Roughly speaking, we observe that the 
reference points shape subjects’ fairness judgments. Our results are summarized as 
follows: 
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Result 1a: Contrary to our hypothesis 1a, the average high performer’s shares are 
considerably larger than the equal-split. However, as stated in our hypothesis 1a, 
they are identical across the vignettes: %63 in WRP-4500, % 60 in WRP-6000, and 
%61 in WRP-3000. 
Supports for result 1a: Figure 1 provides a graphical support for our result 1a. It 
depicts the distribution of fairness judgments in vignettes without reference point. As 
we can see from figure 1, in WRP-4500 the high performer’s share ranges from %33 
to %99, with a peak at around %70, while in WRP-6000 and WRP-3000 the high 
performer’s share range from %13 to %100 and %33 to %100, with peaks at around 
%50. On the other hand, the equal performer’s share in WRP-4500 ranges from %17 
to %100, with a peak at %50. Furthermore, pair-wise comparisons using Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (WSR) reports that the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
fairness judgments in WRP-6000 and WRP-3000 are the same cannot be rejected 
(p=0.8573), while the other null hypotheses of equal distributions can be rejected (p 
< 0.0001). 
	  
Figure 1. Fairness judgments in V1 
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Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in V1. It 
reports that the average high performer’s shares are similar across vignettes and 
significantly larger than the equal-split. Namely, the average high performer’s share 
is %63 in WRP-4500, % 60 in WRP-6000, and %61 in WRP-3000. Multivariate test 
of means, however, strongly rejects the null hypothesis that all means are the same  
(p=0.0007). On the other hand, the paired t-test reveals that the difference in the 
average high performer’s share between WRP-6000 and WRP-3000 is not significant 
(p = 0.3138), while the other differences are significant (p= 0.0002; p = 0.0103). 
 
Table 3. Average high performer’s shares in V1 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.60 (0.10) 6000 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.61 (0.10) 3000 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.63 (0.08) 4500 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.51 (0.04) 4500 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 1b: As stated in our hypothesis 1b, the variances of fairness judgments in V1 
are very similar to each other. That is, the standard deviation is % 8 in WRP-4500, 
%10 in WRP-3000 and WRP-6000. Moreover, the variances of fairness judgments in 
the high performer’s share are higher than the variance of fairness judgments in the 
equal performer’s share. 
Supports for result 1b: According to Table 3, the variances of fairness judgments in 
the high performer’s share are considerably higher than in the equal performer’s 
share. To be precise, in WRP-6000 and WRP-3000 standard deviations of fairness 
judgments in the high performer’s share are %10 and in WRP-4500 it is %8, while in 
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WRP-4500 the standard deviation of fairness judgments in equal performer’s share is 
%4. Furthermore, comparisons across vignettes using One-sample variance	   test 
reports that the difference in the variances of fairness judgments in the high 
performer’s share between WRP-6000 and WRP-3000 is not significant (chi2, p = 
0.5051), while the other differences are highly significant (chi2, p = 0.0001; p = 
0.0004). 	  
Result 1c: As hypothesized, the average equal performer’s shares in V-2250 and in 
WRP-4500 are very similar. That is, in V-2250 the average equal performer’s share 
is %52, while in WRP-4500 it is %51. 
Supports for result 1c: Figure 2 provides a graphical support for our result 1b. It 
depicts the distributions of fairness judgments in the equal performer’s share. In 
WRP-4500 the equal performer’s share ranges from %17 to %100, with a peak at 
%50, while in V-2250 the equal performer’s share ranges from %40 to %80, with a 
peak at %50. In addition, 160 subjects assigned the equal performers half of surplus 
in WRP-4500, whereas 182 subjects assigned the equal performers half the surplus in 
V-2250. Moreover, WSR test reports that null hypothesis of equal distribution can be 
rejected (p = 0.0019). 
	  
Figure 2. Fairness judgments in WRP-4500 and V-2250 
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Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in the equal 
performer’s share. It indicates that average equal performer’s shares across vignettes 
are very similar. That is, the equal performer’s share in V-2250 is %52, which is 1 
percentage point higher than in WRP- 4500. The paired t-test also reports that the 
equal performer’s share in V-2250 is not statistically different from equal 
performer’s share in WRP-4500 (p = 0.0962).  
 
Table 4. Average equal performer’s shares in V1 and V2 
Reference 
Point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(2250, 2250) (0.50, 0.50) 0.52 (0.06) 4500 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.51 (0.04) 4500 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 1d: As stated in our hypothesis 1d, the variance of fairness judgments in V1 
and V2 are identical. Namely, in V-2250 the standard deviation is %6, whereas in 
WRP-4500 the standard deviation is %4. 
Supports for 1d: According to Table 4, the variance of fairness judgments in V-
2250 is very similar to in WRP-4500. More clearly, the standard deviation in V-2250 
is %6, only 2 percentage points higher than in WRP-4500. However, the one-sample 
variance comparison test indicates that the equality of variances of fairness 
judgments can clearly be rejected (chi2, p < 0.0001). 
Result 1e: As hypothesized, the average high performer’s shares in V1 are fairly 
lower than the average high performer’s shares in V2. Namely, the average high 
performer’s share is %60 in WRP-3000, % 61 in WRP-6000, and % 63 in WRP-
4500, while it is %61 in V-3753,  %74 in V-0, %70 in V-2253, and %74 in V- 3747. 
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Supports for result 1e: Figure 3, 4, and 5 allow us to support our result 1c. From 
figure 3, we can observe that the high performer’s share in both WRP-4500 and V-
3747 range from %33 to %99.  However, in WRP-4500 there is a peak at around 
%70, whereas in V-3747 there is a peak at %80. Moreover, WSR test	  rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal distributions (p = 0.0205). 
	  
Figure 3. Fairness judgments in WRP-4500 and V-3747 	  
From Figure 4, we can see that the distributions of fairness judgments differ 
across the vignettes. In WRP-6000 the high performer’s share ranges from %13 to % 
100, with a peak at around %50, while in V-6000 the high performer’s share ranges 
%0 to %100, with a peak at around %70. Another interesting observation is that in 
contrast to WRP-6000, in V-6000 33 subjects thought that the high performer should 
receive the all surplus. WSR test suggests that both distributions are not the same (p 
<0.0001). As we can also observe from Figure 1d, similar to WRP-6000 the high 
performer’s share in V-3753 ranges from %33 to %100. However, for V-3753 there 
is a peak at %60. WSR test also reveals that the null hypothesis of equal distributions 
cannot be rejected. (p = 0.2871).  
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Figure 4. Fairness judgments in WRP-6000, V-3753, and V-6000 
From Figure 5, we can observe that the distributions of fairness judgments in 
WRP-3000 and in V-2253 are different from each other. In WRP-3000 the high 
performer’s share ranges from %33 to %100, with a peak at around %50, while in V-
2253 the high performer’s share ranges from %0 to %99, with a peak at around %70. 
Moreover, WSR test confirms that the distributions of fairness judgments in WRP-
3000 and V-2253 are not the same (p < 0.0001). 
	  
Figure 5. Fairness judgments in WRP-3000 and V-2253 
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That is, in WRP-4500 the average high performer’s share is %61, which is 13 
percentage points lower than in V-3747. In WRP-3000 the average high performer’s 
share is %60, which is 10 percentage points lower than in V-2253. In WRP-6000 the 
average high performer’s share is %60, which is 14 percentage points higher than in 
V-6000. Apart from these results, the paired t-test reports that the difference in the 
average high performer’s shares between WRP-6000 and V-3753, which is 1 
percentage point, is not significant (p=0.1567), while the other differences are 
significant (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). 
 
Table 5. Average high performer’s shares in V1 and V2 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(3753, 2247) (0.63, 0.37) 0.61 (0.07) 6000 
(6000, 0) (1, 0) 0.74 (0.20) 6000 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯ 0.60 (0.10) 6000 
(2253, 747) (0.75, 0.25) 0.70 (0.11) 3000 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯ 0.61 (0.10) 3000 
(3747, 753) (0.83, 0.17) 0.74 (0.12) 4500 
⎯⎯  ⎯⎯ 0.62 (0.08) 4500 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 1f: Contrary to our hypothesis 1e, the variances of fairness judgments in V1 
are lower than the variances of fairness judgments in V2. The standard deviation is 
%10 in WRP-3000, WRP-6000, and %8 in WRP-4500, while it is %7 in V-3753,  
%20 in V-0, %11 in V-2253, and % 12 in V- 3747. 
Supports for result 1f: Table 5 displays that the variances of fairness judgments in 
V2 are significantly higher than in V1.	  (The only exception is the variance of fairness 
judgments in V-3753, which is fairly lower than the variance of fairness judgments 
in WRP-6000.) Specifically, we compare standard deviations of fairness judgments 
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in V2 to in V1. First of all, in V-6000 standard deviation is %20, while in WRP-6000 
the standard deviation is %10. One-sample variance comparison test strongly rejects 
the equality of variances of fairness judgments (chi2, p < 0.0001). Moreover, in V-
2253 the variance of fairness judgments seems to be very similar to the variance in 
WRP-3000. Namely, the standard deviation in V-2253 is %11, which is only 1 
percentage point greater than in WRP-3000. Yet, One-sample variance comparison 
test indicates that the difference in the variances of fairness judgments between V-
2253 and WRP-3000 is significant (p = 0.0255). Finally, the difference in standard 
deviation between V-3747 and WRP- 4500 is %4. One sample variance comparison 
test confirms that the difference is significant (chi2, p = 0.0009).	  
In conclusion, the data partially support our hypothesis 1a, which states that 
the average high performer’s shares in V1 are not different from each other and do 
not differ from the equal split. We show that the average high performer’s shares are 
identical across vignettes and significantly larger than the equal-split. Moreover, the 
data does not confirm our hypothesis 1f, which indicates that the variances of the 
fairness judgments in V1 are higher than the variances of the fairness judgments in 
V2. Consequently, our findings allow us to reject this hypothesis. On the other hand, 
our data strongly supports our hypotheses 1b, 1c, 1d and 1e. 
Result 2: Fairness Judgments and Counter-Intuitive Reference Points 
To test our hypothesis 2, we compare the average high performer’s shares in the 
vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point (V2) to in the vignettes without 
reference point (V1) and the vignettes with salient reference point (V3). Moreover, 
we analyze the variances of fairness judgments in all vignettes. Roughly speaking,  
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we find that subjects do not take into account the counter-intuitive reference points, 
while making their decisions. Our results are summarized as follows: 
Result 2a: As stated in our hypothesis 2a, the average high performer’s shares in V3 
are very similar to the average share high performer’s shares in V1. That is, the 
average high performer’s share is %56 in V-2242, %60 in V-0, %58 in V-755, and 
%57 in V-756; on the other hand, it is  %60 in WRP-3000, % 61 in WRP-6000, and 
% 63 in WRP-4500. 
Supports for result 2a: Figure 6, 7 and 8 help us to support our result 2a. As we can 
see from Figure 6, the high performer’s share in V-755 ranges from %11 to %100, 
whereas the high performer’s share in WRP-3000 ranges from %33 to %100. 
However, for both vignettes there is a peak at about %50. One of interesting findings 
that the Figure 6 shows us is that in V-755 49 subjects thought that the high 
performer should receive less than half the surplus. However, in WRP-3000 only 3 
subjects consider that the high performer should get less than half the surplus. 
Moreover, WSR test reports that the null hypothesis of the equal distributions cannot 
be rejected (p = 0.5514). 
	  	  
Figure 6. Fairness judgments in V-755 and WRP-3000 
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From Figure 7, we can observe that in V-2242 the high performer’s share 
ranges from %0 to %100, while in WRP-6000 the high performer’s share ranges 
from %13 to %100. However, for both vignettes there is a peak at around %50. 
Another important result is that compared to WRP-6000, in V-2242 58 subjects 
assigned the high performer less than half the surplus. Furthermore, WSR test 
indicates that the null hypothesis of equal distributions can be rejected (p < 0.0001). 
	  	  
Figure 7. Fairness judgments in V-2242 and WRP-6000 
From Figure 8, we can explore that in V-0 the high performer’s share ranges 
from %0 to %100, whereas in WRP-6000 the high performer ranges from %13 to 
%100. However, for both vignettes there is a peak at around %50. One further 
important point is that in V-0 11 subjects thought that the high performer should 
receive nothing, while 28 subjects thought that the high performer should receive the 
all surplus. Yet, WSR test reports that both distributions are the same (p = 0.7042). 
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Figure 8. Fairness judgments in V-0 and WRP-6000 	  
From Figure 9, we can see that the high performer’s share in V-756 ranges 
from about %10 to %100, with a peak at %80, while the high performer’s share in 
WRP-4500 ranges from about % 33 to %99, with a peak at around %70. One further 
interesting observation is that in V-756 64 subjects thought that the high performer 
should get less than half the surplus, while only 3 subjects thought that the high 
performer should get less than half the surplus. Furthermore, WSR test indicates that 
the distributions of fairness judgments in V-756 and WRP-4500 are not the same (p 
= 0.0205). 
	  	  
Figure 9. Fairness judgments in V-756 and WRP-4500 
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Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in V1 and V3. 
It shows that the average high performer’s shares in V3 are similar to the average 
high performer’s share in V1. That is, the average high performer’s share in V-0 is 
%60, which is exactly the same as the average high performer’s share in WRP-6000. 
The paired t-test also indicates that the difference in fairness judgments between 
WRP-6000 and V-0 is not significant. (p = 0.7042). Table 6 also reports that the 
difference between V-755 and WRP-3000, which equals 3 percentage points, is not 
significant either (p = 0. 0768). However, the paired t-test suggests that the 
differences between V-2242 and WRP-6000 as well as V-756 and WRP-4500 are 
significant (p < 0.0001; p = 0.0009). 
 
Table 6. The average high performer’s shares in V1 and V3 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(2242, 3758) (0.37, 0.63) 0.56 (0.14) 6000 
(0, 6000) (0, 1) 0.60 (0.30) 6000 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.60 (0.10) 6000 
(755, 2245) (0.25, 0.75) 0.58 (0.20) 3000 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.61 (0.10) 3000 
(756, 3744) (0.17, 0.83) 0.57 (0.25) 4500 
⎯⎯ ⎯⎯ 0.62 (0.08) 4500 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 2b: Contrary to our hypothesis, the variances of fairness judgments in V3 are 
not similar to the variances of fairness judgments in V1. In fact, they are higher in V3 
than in V1. Namely, the standard deviation is %14 in V-2242,  %30 in V-0, %20 in 
V-755, and %25 in V-756; on the other hand, it is %10 in WRP-3000, WRP-6000, 
and  %8 in WRP-4500. 
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Supports for result 2b: According to Table 6, the variances of fairness judgments in 
V3 are considerably higher than variances of fairness judgments in V1. In particular, 
we compare standard deviations of fairness judgments in V3 to in V1. First of all, the 
standard deviation in V-0 is 20 percentage points higher than the standard deviation 
in WRP-6000. Compared to the difference between V-0 and WRP-6000, the 
difference in standard deviation between V-2242 and WRP-6000 is very small, 
namely 4 percentage points. Yet, One sample comparison test reports that the 
difference is significant (chi2, p <0.0001). Moreover, the standard deviation in 755-
V is twice as high than in WRP-3000. Finally, the standard deviation in 756-V is 
roughly three times as high than in WRP-4500. In addition to these results, the pair-
wise comparisons using One-sample variance comparison test indicates that the 
variances of fairness judgments in V3 are significantly different from variances of 
fairness judgments in V1 (chi2, p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). 
Result 2c: As stated in our hypothesis 2c, the average high performer’s shares in V3 
are fairly lower than in V2. That is, the average high performer’s share is %56 in V-
2242, %60 in V-0, %58 in V-755, and %57 in V-756; on the other hand, the average 
high performer’s share is %61 in V-3753,  %74 in V-0, %70 in V-2253, and %74 in 
V- 3747. 
Supports for result 2c: Figure 10, 11, 12, and 13 provide supports for our result 2c. 
From Figure 10, we can observe that in V-2242 the high performer’s share ranges 
from about %0 to %100, with a peak at around %50, while in V-3753 the high 
performer’s share ranges from about %33 to %100, with a peak at %60. Another 
important result is that in V-2242 58 subjects consider that the high performer should 
get less than half the surplus, while in V- 3753 only 1 subject thought that the high 
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performer deserve less than half the surplus. Moreover, WSR test confirms that both 
distributions are not the same ( p < 0.0001 for all comparisons).  
	  
Figure 10. Fairness judgments in V-2242 and V-3753 
From Figure 11, the high performer’s share in V-755 ranges from about %11 
to %100, with a peak at around %50, whereas the high performer’s share in V-2253 
ranges from %0 to %98, with a peak at around %70. One further interesting result is   
that Figure 2f presents to us is that in V-755 49 subjects thought that the high 
performer should receive less than half the surplus. However, in V-2253 only 3 
subjects assigned the high performer less than half the surplus. Moreover, WSR test 
reports that the null hypothesis of the equal distributions can be rejected (p <0.0001). 
	  	  
Figure 11. Fairness judgments in V-755 and V-2253 
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From Figure 12, we can see that the high performer’s share in V-756 ranges 
from about %7 to %100, while the high performer’s share in V- 3747 ranges from 
about % 33 to %99. However, for both vignettes there is a peak at %80. One further 
interesting observation is that in V-756 64 subjects thought that the high performer 
should get less than half the surplus, while in V- 3747 only 4 subjects thought that 
the high performer should get less than half the surplus. Furthermore, WSR test 
indicates that the distributions of fairness judgments in V-756 and WRP-4500 are not 
the same (p < 0.00001).  
	  	  
Figure 12. Fairness judgments in V-756 and V-3747 
From Figure 13, we can observe that for V-0 and V-600, the high performer’s 
share ranges from %0 to %100. However, in V-0 there is peak at around %50, 
whereas in V-6000 there is a peak at %60. Another interesting result is that in V-0 11 
subjects thought that the high performer should receive nothing, while in V-6000 
only 1 subject thought that the high performer should receive nothing. Moreover, 28 
subjects in V-0 and 33 subjects in V-6000 assigned the high performer all surplus. In 
addition to these results, the WSR test reports that both distributions are not the same 
(p < 0.0001). 
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Figure 13. Fairness judgments in V-0 and V-6000 
Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in V2 and V3. 
It reports that the average high performer’s shares in V2 are fairly lower than in V3. 
More clearly, the differences in average high performer’s share between V2 and V3 
range from 5 percentage points to 17 percentage points. The paired t-test also 
confirms that the average high performer’s shares in V2 are significantly lower than 
the average high performer’s shares in V3 (p < 0.0001). 
 
Table 7. The average high performer’s shares in V2 and V3 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(3753, 2247) (0.63, 0.37) 0.61 (0.07) 6000 
(2242, 3758) (0.37, 0.63) 0.56 (0.14) 6000 
(2253, 747) (0.75, 0.25) 0.70 (0.11) 3000 
(755, 2245) (0.25, 0.75) 0.58 (0.20) 3000 
(3747, 753) (0.83, 0.17) 0.74 (0.12) 4500 
(756, 3744) (0.17, 0.83) 0.57 (0.25) 4500 
(6000, 0) (1, 0) 0.74 (0.20) 6000 
(0, 6000) (0, 1) 0.60 (0.30) 6000 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 2d: As stated in our hypothesis 2d, the variances of fairness judgments in V3 
are higher than in V2. The standard deviation is %14 in V-2242,  %30 in V-0, %20 in 
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V-755, and %25 in V-756; on the other hand, it is %7 in V-3753,  %11 in V-0, %12 
in V-2253, and %20 in V- 3747. 
Supports for result 2d: According to Table 7, the variances of fairness judgments in 
V3 are significantly higher than variances of fairness judgments in V2. Specifically, 
we compare standard deviations of fairness judgments in V2 to in V3. First of all, the 
standard deviation in 2242-V is twice as high than in 3753-V. Namely, in 2242-V it 
is %14, while in 3753-V it is %7. Moreover, the standard deviation in 755-V, which 
is %20, is roughly twice as high than in 2253-V. Similarly, this relationship is 
observed between 756-V and 3747-V. Finally, the standard deviation in 0-V is one 
and a half times high than in 6000-V. That is, in 0-V it is %30, while in 6000-V it is 
%15. Apart from these results comparisons across vignettes using One-sample 
variance comparison test clearly shows that the equality of variances of fairness 
judgments in V2 and V3 can be rejected (chi2, p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). 
In conclusion, the data supports our hypothesis 2a, 2c, and 2d. However, our 
data does not confirm our hypothesis 2b, which states that the variances of fairness 
judgments in V3 are similar to the variances of fairness judgments in V1. Indeed, we 
find that they are higher in V3 than in V2.  
Result 3: Fairness Judgments and Asymmetry of Reference Points 
 
To test our hypothesis 3, we compare the average high performer’s share across the 
vignettes with reference point. In addition to this, we analyze the variances of 
fairness judgments in these vignettes. As a result, we find that the asymmetry of 
salient reference point has a concave relationship with the average high performer’s 
share; on the other hand, the asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference point does not 
affect the subjects’ fairness judgments. Our results are summarized as follows: 
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Result 3a: Contrary to our hypothesis 3a, there is a concave relationship between the 
average high performer’s share and the asymmetry of salient reference point. 
Namely, the average high performer’s share is %52 in V-2250, % 61 in V-3753, %70 
in V-2253, and %74 in V-3747 and V-6000. 
Supports for result 3a: The figure 14 allows us to support our result 3a. It shows 
the distribution of fairness judgments in V2. In V-3753 the high performer’s share 
ranges from %33 to %100, with a peak at %60. On the other hand, in V-2253 and V-
3747 high performer’s shares range from % 0 to %98, with peaks at roughly %75 
and %80, while in V-6000 the high performer’s share ranges from %0 to %100, with 
a peak at roughly % 70. We can infer from this result that as the asymmetry of 
reference points increases, the range of high performer’s share extends. Another 
important observation is that in V-6000 33 subjects assigned the high performer to 
all amounts of surplus, whereas only 1 subject in V-3753 and none of the subjects in 
the other vignettes assigned the high performer to all amounts of surplus. From this 
observation, we can conclude that even when the reference point is strongly 
asymmetric, some of the subjects take into account the reference point, and split the 
surplus according to it. 
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Figure 14. Fairness Judgments in V2 
Table 9 displays the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in V2. It 
shows the asymmetry of salient reference points increases the average high 
performer’s share; however, at some point increases in the asymmetry of reference 
points are not associated with increases in the average high performer’s share. As we 
can see from Table-6, the difference in the average high performer’s share between 
V-2250 and V-2253 is highly significant, namely it is %18; on the other hand, the 
average high performer’s shares in V-3747 and V-6000 are the same. The paired t-
test also confirms that the average high performer’s share in V-3747 is not 
statistically different from the average high performer’s share in V-6000 (p = 
0.5843). However, Multivariate test of means suggests that all means significantly 
differ across the vignettes (p < 0.0001). 
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Table 8. The average high performer’s shares in V2 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(2250, 2250) 
(3753, 2247) 
(0.50, 0.50) 
(0.63, 0.37) 
0.52 
0.61 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
4500 
6000 
(2253, 747) (0.75, 0.25) 0.70 (0.11) 3000 
(3747, 753) (0.83, 0.17) 0.74 (0.12) 4500 
(6000, 0) (1, 0) 0.74 (0.20) 6000 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 3b: As hypothesized, the variances of fairness judgments in V2 are higher 
when reference points are more asymmetric. That is, the standard deviation is %6 in 
V-2250, %7 in 3753, % 11 in V-2253, %12 in V-3747, and %20 in V-6000. 
Supports for result 3b:  According to Table 9, the variance is significantly higher in 
V-6000 than in other vignettes. The standard deviation when reference point is 
symmetric, namely (2250, 2250), is %6, whereas the standard deviation when 
reference point is strongly asymmetric, namely (6000, 0), is %20. However, One-
sample variance comparison test reports that the variance of fairness judgments in V-
2250 is not significantly different from the variance of fairness judgments in V-3753 
(chi2 test, p = 0.9384). Similarly, this relationship holds for V-2253 and V-3747 
(chi2, p = 0.1752). 
Result 3c: Contrary to our hypothesis 3c, the average high performer’s shares in V3 
are not affected by the asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference points. That is, the 
average high performer’s share is %56 in V-2242, %58 in V-755, %57 in V-756, and 
%60 in V-0. 
Supports for result 3c: Figure 15 provides a graphical support for our results. It 
depicts distribution of fairness judgments in V3. In V-755 and V-756 the high 
performer’s share ranges from %10 to %100; on the other hand, in V-2242 and V-0 
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the high performer’s share ranges from %0 to %100. Moreover, except for V-756 
there is a peak at around % 50 in each vignette. However, for V-756 there is a peak 
at %80. A further important result is that none of the subjects in V-2242 and only 2 
subjects in V-755, V-756 assigned all amounts of surplus to the high performer, 
whereas in V-0 28 subjects assigned the high performer to all amounts of surplus. In 
addition, compared to the other vignettes, in V-0 11 subjects thought that the high 
performer should receive nothing. From these results, we can conclude that even 
when the reference point is counter-intuitive and also strongly asymmetric, a few 
subjects take into account this reference point while making their decisions.  
	  	  
Figure 15.  Fairness Judgments in V3 
Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics of fairness judgments in V3. It 
shows that average high performer’s shares are identical across the vignettes. 
Multivariate test of means also confirms that all means are the same in V3 (p = 
0.1059). However, pair-wise comparisons using the paired t-test reports that the high 
performer’s share in V-2242 is significantly different from the high performer’s  
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share in V-0 and V-756 (p = 0.0306; 0.0357), while there are no significant pair-wise 
differences between the other vignettes (p = 0.0650; p = 0.4131; p =0.2084; p = 
0.5864).  
 
Table 9. The average high performer’s shares in V3 
Reference 
point 
Percentage Answer (SD) Previous 
Surplus 
(2242, 
3758) 
(0.37, 0.63) 0.56 (0.14) 6000 
(755, 2245) (0.25, 0.75) 0.58 (0.20) 3000 
(756, 3744) (0.17, 0.83) 0.57 (0.25) 4500 
(0, 6000) (0, 1) 0.60 (0.30) 6000 
Note: Table reports answers on averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Result 3d: As hypothesized, the variances of fairness judgments in V3 are higher 
when reference points are more asymmetric. That is, the standard deviation is %14 in 
V-2242, %20 in V-755, % 25 in V-756, and %30 in V-0. 
Supports for result 3d: Table 8 reports that the variance of fairness judgments in V-
0 is greater than the other vignettes in V3. That is, the standard deviation when the 
reference point is strongly asymmetric, namely (0, 6000), is %30, while the standard 
deviation when reference point is weakly asymmetric, namely (2242, 3758), is %14.  
Moreover, comparisons across vignettes using One-sample variance comparison test 
reports that variances significantly different from each other (chi2, p < 0.0001). 
To sum up, our data does not support our hypothesis 3a, which states that the 
asymmetry of reference points increases the variance of the fairness judgments. We 
find that there is a concave relationship between the average high performer’s share 
and the asymmetry of salient reference point. Moreover, our data does not confirm 
our hypothesis 3c. We observe that the average high performer’s shares in V3 are not 
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affected by the asymmetry of counter-intuitive reference points. However, the data 
confirms our hypothesis 3b and 3d, which indicates that the variances of fairness 
judgments are higher, when reference points are more asymmetric.  
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CHAPTER 6 	  	  
CONCLUSION 	  	  	  	  
In this paper, we empirically examine the effects of reference points on fairness 
judgments. Specifically, we investigate (i) whether the reference points have 
influence on fairness judgments or not, (ii) if and how the counter-intuitive reference 
points influence fairness judgments, and (iii) how the asymmetry of reference points 
shape fairness judgments. In our study, we accomplish to assess subjects’ fairness 
judgments with the help of a vignette study. The reason why we use the vignette 
technique is that it helps us to introduce the bargaining problem with reference points 
to subjects by presenting them hypothetical situations and persons. To be more 
precise, by means of vignettes, we introduce the bargaining environment to subjects 
by presenting them a hypothetical firm, and hence easily model the reference point as 
the firm’s previous policy for splitting the surplus.  
In our vignette study, to explore the effects of reference points on fairness 
judgments, we use a within-subject design, in which subjects are confronted with 
three versions of vignette: vignettes without reference point, vignettes with salient 
reference point, and vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point. More clearly, 
these versions differ in two respects. First, the information about the firm’s previous 
policy is not given in the vignettes without reference point. Second, the previous 
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surplus is not split according to performance in the vignettes with counter-intuitive 
reference point. Here we assign the lower amounts of surplus to high performers, 
whereas, the higher amounts of surplus to low performers. In the vignettes with 
salient reference point, however, the previous surplus is split according to 
performance. To our knowledge, our vignette design is novel as there has been no 
previous study that combines three versions of vignette into one design and varies 
the reference point over a fairly high number of possible values. 
Our three main results provide new insights into the effects of reference 
points in negotiations. First, we find that the reference points significantly influence 
the fairness judgments. Our data reports that the amounts that subjects assigned to 
the high performer in the vignettes with salient reference point are greater than in the 
vignettes without reference point. We infer from this result that subjects take into 
account the reference point, while making their decisions. Our results thus contribute 
the experimental literature on the effects of reference points in negotiations. ((see, for 
instance, Gupta and Livne, 1989; Blount et al., 1996; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 
Abeler et al., 2009; Herweg and Schmidt, 2013; Bartling and Schmidt, 2014; Fehr et 
al., 2014).  
Second, we point out that introducing counter-intuitive reference points 
moderate the salience of reference points. Our data suggests that subjects’ answers in 
the vignettes with counter-intuitive reference point do not differ from in the vignettes 
without reference point. With the help of this result, we conclude that subjects do not 
consider the counter-intuitive reference points, while making their decisions. Hence, 
our findings contribute to the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the 
importance of salient reference points in negotiations. (see, for instance, Koop and 
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Johnson, 2010; Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Herweg and Schmidt, 2013). Additionally, 
we find that the variances of fairness judgments in the vignettes with counter-
intuitive reference point are significantly higher than in the other two versions of 
vignette. The reason for this observation could be that the counter-intuitive reference 
points do not play a coordinating role in subjects’ decision-making. Namely, while 
making their decisions, some of the subjects behave as if they were confronted with 
the vignettes without reference point. Therefore, they may apply the same decision 
criterion that they used in the vignettes without reference point. On the other hand, 
since two persons introduced in the vignettes are strategically equivalent, some of the 
subjects may consider the equal-split as fair, or find the inverse proportionality rule 
fair. For these reasons, in these vignettes the different decision criterions can emerge 
as a focal point and attract subjects’ fair distribution decisions. This may lead to 
increases in the heterogeneity in subjects’ fairness judgments.  
Third, we see that the asymmetry of reference points is an important factor 
affecting the fairness judgments. Our data indicates that there is a concave 
relationship between the average high performer’s share and the asymmetry of 
salient reference point. In addition, we observe that the asymmetry of salient 
reference points increase the variances of fairness judgments. The reason for this 
finding may be that the asymmetric reference points cannot play a coordinating role 
in subjects’ decision-making. In other words, subjects may consider the firm’s 
previous policy as unfair and do not take into account, while making their decisions. 
In this case, the different decision criterions can emerge as a focal point that shapes 
the subjects’ decisions. This may explain why we observe higher heterogeneity in the 
vignettes with asymmetric reference point. In this respect, our findings are consistent 
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with Gächter and Riedl (2006). Specifically, they report that the asymmetry of 
reference points shape the fairness judgments and also increase the heterogeneity in 
the fairness judgments. However, contrary to Gächter and Riedl (2006), we also 
examine the effects of counter-intuitive reference points and find that the asymmetry 
of counter-intuitive reference points does not affect the fairness judgments. Namely, 
our data shows that subjects’ answers are identical across the vignettes with counter-
intuitive reference point. Nevertheless, we observe that the asymmetry of counter-
intuitive reference points increases the variances in the fairness judgments.  
Finally, it would be very interesting to assess subjects’ actual bargaining 
behavior by means of our research design and then to compare subjects’ fairness 
judgments with subjects’ actual bargaining behavior. In particular, investigating the 
effects of counter-intuitive reference points in negotiations is an appealing topic for 
future research.  
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APPENDIX A 	  	  
RESULTS OF POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 	  	  	  	  
As mentioned in chapter 3, after conducting the vignette study we asked subjects to 
complete the post-experimental questionnaire. Here we analyze the data collecting 
from the post-experimental questionnaire and investigate whether personal 
characteristics of subjects, such as age, gender, personality traits, justice sensitivity 
etc., affect fairness judgments. For these variables, we employ Kruskal-Wallis test 
and test whether the null hypothesis that the samples are from the same population 
can be rejected or not. Below, we first give detailed information about the post-
experimental questionnaire and then report our findings. 
Part 1: Questions about Subjects’ Decisions 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we first asked subjects to report the factors 
that influenced their fair distribution decisions and the decision criterions that they 
applied in the vignette study. Specifically, we asked them the following two 
questions:  
1. Which factors influenced your fair distribution decisions in the vignette 
study? Please rank these factors you mentioned from the most important one 
to the least important one. 
2. Did you apply the same decision criterion in all vignettes or did you apply 
different decision criterions across the vignettes? Please explain briefly.  
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For the first question, we categorized the subjects’ answers into three main groups:  
(i) the relative performance of person A and B, (ii) the firm’s previous policy for 
splitting the surplus, and (iii) the asymmetry of reference points. Most of the subjects 
stated that the firm’s previous policy is an important factor shaping their fairness 
judgments. For the second question, a few subjects reported that they applied the 
same decision criterion in all vignettes. However, most of the subjects indicated that 
they applied different decision criterions across three versions of vignette. In 
particular, subjects stated that they applied the same decision criterion in each 
vignette without reference point, that is they assigned the high performer to greater 
than half of the surplus and the equal performers to the same amounts of surplus. On 
the other hand, for vignettes with salient reference point subjects mentioned that they 
divided 9000 points between person A and B according to the firm’s previous policy, 
if the differences in the amounts that high performers and low performers received 
are small (i.e., the differences in the asymmetry of reference point are small). 
Otherwise, they implemented a different decision criterion that they consider it as 
fair. Subjects also mentioned that they behaved as if they did not have information 
about the firm’s previous policy for splitting the surplus in the vignettes with 
counter-intuitive reference point, and so apply the same decision criterion that they 
used in the vignettes without reference point. Furthermore, a considerable number of 
subjects indicated that neither person A and nor person B deserves to receive 0 point 
even if they are the low performer.  
Part 2: Scenario 
In this part, we confronted subjects with a hypothetical scenario in order to examine 
whether being a strict egalitarian, libertarian, and liberal egalitarian matter for 
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fairness judgments. In particular, we presented the following scenario to subjects 
(translated from Turkish): 
Imagine the following situation. Person X is randomly assigned a 
productivity parameter r(X)=2, and Person Y is randomly assigned a 
productivity parameter r(Y)=3. They do not have any control over these 
assignments. Both Person X and Y are endowed with 100 points from which 
they can contribute to a joint surplus that they will later share. The amounts 
they do not contribute to the joint surplus are left for their individual uses. 
 
The contribution of Person X (denoted by c(X)) is multiplied with his 
productivity parameter and the contribution of Person Y (denoted by c(Y)) is 
similarly multiplied with his productivity parameter. The sum of these 
numbers make up the surplus that will be distributed between X and Y. 
Hence, S=r (X)*c (X) + r (Y)*c (Y). 
 
You are told that Person X has contributed 60 points whereas Person Y has 
contributed 30 points to the joint surplus. Hence, the value of the surplus is 
(60*2) +(30*3)=210 points. 
 
 
Please put yourself in the shoes of a non-involved, neutral, and third party 
and propose a fair distribution of the surplus according to your opinion. 
Remember that two numbers you propose should add up to 210. Decimal 
numbers are not allowed.  
 
For Person X:………… points 
 
For Person Y:………… points 
 
 
According to subjects’ answers, 67 subjects (out of 196) are libertarian, 34 
subjects are liberal egalitarian, and only 7 subjects are strict egalitarian. To 
investigate whether subjects’ strict egalitarian, libertarian, or liberal egalitarian 
ambitious influence their fairness judgments, we used Kruskal-Wallis test, which 
reports that the null hypothesis that three samples are from the identical populations 
can not be rejected (p = 0.2189; p = 0.5241; p = 0.6723; p = 0.9915; p = 0.7250; p = 
0.8370; p = 0.8015; p = 0.3254; p = 0.0824; p = 0.1494; p = 0.3128; p = 0.5527).  
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Part 3: Big-Five personality Test  
We also presented Big Five personality test (Gosling et al., 2003) to subjects to 
measure personality traits, such as extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, and openness to experiences, which may have influence on their 
fairness judgments. In particular, we confronted subjects with the following test: 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. 
Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which 
the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more 
strongly than the other. 
 
1: Disagree strongly, 2: Disagree moderately, 3: Disagree a little, 4: Neither 
agree nor disagree, 5: Agree a little, 6: Agree moderately, 7: Agree strongly 
 
_____  Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
_____  Critical, quarrelsome. 
_____  Dependable, self-disciplined. 
_____  Anxious, easily upset. 
_____  Open to new experiences, complex.  
_____  Reserved, quiet. 
_____  Sympathetic, warm. 
_____  Disorganized, careless. 
_____  Calm, emotionally stable. 
_____  Conventional, uncreative. 	  
 
We find no clear evidence to conclude that personal traits affect subjects’ 
fairness judgments. Subjects high in one of these traits do not behave differently, 
when compared to subjects low in one of these traits. Kruskal-Wallis test confirms 
that for each trait there is no significant difference in the distribution of fairness 
judgments between subjects who make a higher score and subjects who make a 
lower score. P-values for each trait are given as follows: 
Extraversion: Subjects’ scores in the Big-Five personality test range from 2 to 15 and 
the mean score is 9.81. 
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p = 0.9389; p = 0.7356; p = 0.9999; p = 0.0314; p = 0.5569; p = 0.6978; p = 0.8901; 
p = 0.0190; p = 0.9786; p = 0.0463; p = 0.2373; p = 0.0430; p = 0. 7576. 
Agreeableness: Subjects’ scores in the Big-Five personality test range from 2 to 14 
and the mean score is 10.11. 
p = 0.5394; p = 0.3239; p = 0.9975; p = 0.1856; p = 0.4797; p = 0.8745; p = 0.8875; 
p = 0.2851; p = 0.4408; p = 0.2628; p = 0.1872; p = 0.6508; p = 0.9270. 
Conscientiousness: Subjects’ scores in the Big-Five personality test range from 2 to 
15 and the mean score is 9.95. 
p = 0.8313; p = 0.1840; p = 0.9999; p = 0.1994; p = 0.4954; p = 0.2789; p = 0.2063; 
p = 0.0490; p = 0.4579; p = 0.1697; p = 0.7146; p = 0.1282; p = 0.9881.  
Emotional stability: Subjects’ scores range from 2 to 14 and the mean score is 8.21. 
p = 0.6539; p = 0.0375; p = 0.9967; p = 0. 6560; p = 0. 9097; p = 0.9651; p = 0.9453; 
p = 0.7270; p = 0.4037; p = 0.7542; p = 0.1976; p = 0.7684; p = 0.9197.  
Openness to experiences: Subjects’ scores in the Big-Five personality test range from 
2 to 14 and the mean score is 10.61. 
p = 0.6758; p = 0.6486; p = 0.9999; p = 0.4917; p = 0.4816; p = 0.2526; p = 0.9362; 
p = 0.5818; p = 0.8323; p = 0.2475; p = 0.3968; p = 0.3326; p = 0.3167.  
Part 4: Justice Sensitivity Test 
In this part, we asked subject to complete justice sensitivity test (Dalbert et al., 1987) 
to identify whether subjects high in justice sensitivity differ from low in justice 
sensitivity in their fairness judgments. Specifically, we presented the following test 
to examine how being sensitive to justice affects subjects’ fairness judgments:  
Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will strongly agree 
with some statements, and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you may 
feel more neutral. Read each statement carefully and decide to what extent 
you personally agree or disagree with it. Make sure you write a number for 
every statement.  
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1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: slightly disagree, 4: slightly agree, 5: 
agree, 6: strongly agree 
1. There is rarely anything that angers me more than injustice.  
______ 
2. It is important to me that my friends are sensitive to injustice. 
______ 
3. Injustice that I did not prevent or I caused torments me for a long time.  
______ 
4. I am outraged when I meet someone who is indifferent to injustice. 
 ______ 
5. I think to observe injustice affects me more than most other people. 
______ 
6. There is nothing more important to me than correcting injustice.   
 ______ 
 
We expect that subjects making higher scores in the test react differently 
when the reference points are more asymmetric or counter-intuitive.  However, we 
observe that the differences in subjects’ sensitivity to justice do not shape their 
fairness judgments. (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.3683; p = 0.9985; p = 0.6611; p = 
0.1397; p = 0.2476; p = 0.8779; p = 0.9495; p = 0.4964; p = 0.2841; p = 0.6131; p = 
0.8577; p = 0.7852; p = 0.7966) 
Part 5: Personal Background 
In the last part, we asked subjects to give information about their personal 
background, such as age, gender, department of study, and year in the department to 
explore whether subjects’ personal background affects their fairness judgments. We 
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do not find any significant effects of age, gender, and year on subjects’ fairness 
judgments. We also examine the effects of department of study; however, it shows 
no clear pattern across the vignettes. Kruskal-Wallis test reports the following p-
values for each variable: 
Age: p = 0.5785; p = 0.4395; p = 0.9307; p = 0.8863; p = 0.3596; p = 0.5896; p = 
0.5962; p = 0.8199; p = 0.8910; p = 0.8800; p = 0.9497; p = 0.1168; p = 0.5275 
Gender: p = 0.8225; p = 0.9160; p = 0.2956; p = 0.4587; p = 0.9647; p = 0.7100; p = 
0.3291; p = 0.2503; p = 0.7169; p = 0.2307; p = 0.0660; p = 0.4998; p = 0.0666 
Year: p = 0.8116; p = 0.3421; p = 0.8630; p = 0.5952; p = 0.5262; p = 0.4399; p = 
0.6235; p = 0.2883; p = 0.3753; p = 0.0529; p = 0.1436; p = 0.1984; p = 0.6615 
Department of study: p = 0.1523; p = 0.0326; p = 0.6420; p = 0.4937; p = 0.2774; p 
= 0.2507; p = 0.5802; p = 0.8689; p = 0.0042; p = 0.3074; p = 0.4896; p = 0.3567; p 
= 0.0818 
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APPENDIX B 	  	  
SAMPLE VIGNETTES 	  	  	  	  
SCENARIO 1: 
Historically, high performers and low performers, who worked in this hypothetical 
firm, earned the total of 4500 points at the end of the task they worked on. However, 
the amounts that high and low performers received are not known. 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in the 
same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points at the end of the task they 
worked on. In order to share the surplus, they have to bargain over 9000 points. In 
case of disagreement, they will earn 0 point. 
 
 
Summary of Information 
Previous 
Surplus 
(points) 
The amounts 
that high 
performers 
received 
previously 
The amounts 
that low 
performers 
received 
previously 
Current 
Total 
Surplus 
(points) 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that A 
receives 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that B 
receives	  
4500 ⎯ ⎯ 9000 0 0	  
 
Please answer the following question according to Scenario 1. 
 
What would be a fair division of 9000 points between high performer A and low 
performer B at the end of the bargaining that they made in order to share the amounts 
they earned? 
 
For A: .................. points 
For B: .................. points 
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SCENARIO 2: 
The detailed information about how the previous surplus was split among persons, 
who worked in this hypothetical firm, is stated below. 
 
Previous surplus: 4500 points 
The amounts that high performers received: 3747 points 
The amounts that low performers received: 753 points 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in the 
same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points, at the end of the task they 
worked on. Due to the change in firm’s policy for distribution of surplus, they have 
to bargain over 9000 points. In case of disagreement, they will earn 0 point. 
 	  
Summary of Information 
Previous 
Surplus 
(points) 
The amounts 
that high 
performers 
received 
previously 
The amounts 
that low 
performers 
received 
previously 
Current Total 
Surplus 
(points) 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that A 
receives 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that B 
receives	  
4500 3747 753 9000 0 0	  
 
Please answer the following question according to Scenario 2. 
 
What would be a fair division of 9000 points between high performer A and low 
performer B at the end of the bargaining that they made in order to share the amounts 
they earned? 
 
For A: .................. points 
For B: .................. points 
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SCENARIO 3: 
The detailed information about how the previous surplus was split among persons, 
who worked in this hypothetical firm, is stated below. 
 
Previous surplus: 4500 points 
The amounts that high performers received: 756 points 
The amounts that low performers received: 3744 points 
 
Currently, high performer A and low performer B, who are also working in the 
same hypothetical firm, earned the total of 9000 points, at the end of the task they 
worked on. Due to the change in firm’s policy for distribution of surplus, they have 
to bargain over 9000 points. In case of disagreement, they will earn 0 point. 
 	  
Summary of Information 
Previous 
Surplus 
(points) 
The amounts 
that high 
performers 
received 
previously 
The amounts 
that low 
performers 
received 
previously 
Current Total 
Surplus 
(points) 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that A 
receives 
In case of 
disagreement 
the amounts 
that B 
receives	  
4500 756 3744 9000 0 0	  
 
Please answer the following question according to Scenario 3. 
 
What would be a fair division of 9000 points between high performer A and low 
performer B at the end of the bargaining that they made in order to share the amounts 
they earned? 
 
For A: .................. points 
For B: .................. points 
 
